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Psychiatry and the subjective: art’s role in challenging objectification in medicine
abstract
Science’s alignment with objectivity has traditionally been posited in counterpoint to art’s potential to represent a subjective perspective. In this context psychiatric discourse could be envisaged as objectifying the patient in the classic doctor-patient relationship whereby a ‘case history’ is constructed within a set of predetermined categories or symptoms. This asymmetry is challenged in proposing that the arts have a responsibility to question the ‘labelling’ and medicalising of human behaviour and emotions, and that film may be the ideal interdisciplinary tool for investigating ‘the inner’, the subjective experience, of a medical condition. Examples are draw from films that deal with the representation of neurological and psychiatric conditions. These film case studies, directed and or produced by the author, are analysed in relation to the filmmaking process and the use of cinematic language to convey the subjective.
Keywords:  interdisciplinarity, film, psychiatry




1. Introduction
This paper addresses the contentious domain of the objective-subjective dichotomy at the heart of contemporary medicine (Beverage, 2002). It attempts to draw attention to the science-centric nature of the profession using the role of art to highlight the intrinsic value of the subjective experience of people with neurological and mental health conditions. It furthermore makes a case for the role of the artist in accessing and articulating the subjective experience of those with certain medical conditions (Crawford et al, 2015. Oyebode, 2009).
This is achieved through case studies of films, directed and or produced by the author, to illustrate the use of cinematic language in conveying the subjective experience of individuals with neurological and mental health conditions. The analyses presented include first-person reflection on the filmmaking process representing a subjective-centric approach as advocated by the paper. 
1.1 Rational Times 
A case for challenging the marginalisation of the humanities in psychiatry can be made by an analysis of papers presented at the European Congress of Psychiatry conferences in 2009 and 2010, showing that approximately 95% addressed, or reported on, objective aspects of psychiatry, including topics such as neuroimaging, statistics and pharmaceutical analysis (EPA Conference). Less than 5% covered areas including the medical humanities, the arts or expressions and representations of patients’ subjective experience. (Data collated by the author).
These statistics give credence to statements such as Darian Leader’s in ‘What is Madness?’: ‘Where old psychiatry books were once filled with reported speech of patients, today all one sees are statistics and pseudo-mathematical diagrams … The individual has vanished.’ (Leader, 2011). The impact that an emphasis on objectification might have on the experience of the patient has raised concerns:
‘Contemporary healthcare’s complex economic, political, technological and commercial context has tended to steer the evidence based agenda towards populations, statistics, risk, and spurious certainty. Despite lip service to shared decision making, patients can be left confused and even tyrannised when their clinical management is inappropriately driven by algorithmic protocols, top-down directives and population targets.’ (Greenhalgh, Hawick, Maskrey, 2014).  
Over and above the medical context introduced here, the film case studies presented in this paper demonstrate underlying mechanisms by which a medical condition has the potential to affect and destabilise an individual’s perception of self, and the sense of identity. Identity (McAdams, 2001), its relationship with a sense of self (Dimaggio et al, 2012), and the despair that characterises the ‘failure of a self fully to know or to become itself, a failure to become self-identical’ (Butler, 2015) underscore the analysis and deconstruction of film language used to convey ‘inner experience’ in the examples presented. 

The artist, in addressing the subjective, can be instrumental in repositioning the individual at the centre of their lives. Both art and artist have the potential to reflect on an individual’s relationship with self and the outside world through the prism of identity (Lloyd, 2009) and thus inevitably the interaction of the patient with the medical profession (Bhugra, De Silva, 2007), the outcome of which can determine the patient’s ‘standing’ in the world. While this interaction can provide much needed help it can also deprive a patient of their freedom.
1.1 Film’s Affinity 
Cinema, with its affinity with dream states and the creation and evocation of subconscious and transient mental states, has been described as the pre-eminent medium through which to convey inner and subjective experience (Fuery, 2004). Film’s narrative, aesthetic and technical codes and devices, its artistic motifs and tropes signifying ‘the inner’, in particular the medium’s use of the point of view shot, are seen to speak directly to an interior reality.
As Douglas Pye states: ‘Films vary in the way in which they deal with the relationship between external action and interior life. It is common for certain moments… to be signalled as offering ‘authentic’ access to thought or feeling…” (Pye, 2000).  The filmmaker endeavours to understand the individuals or characters portrayed, and it is therefore important to engage with the subjective experience of those in the film when conveying the nature of a medical condition. The capacity to listen and respond to those whose stories the filmmaker wishes to reflect is the primary objective in determining artistic representation. Commitment to biographical accuracy in representing a medical condition underlies the responsibility of the author in the film case studies presented below.
2. CASE STUDIES
The following case studies examine two films on neurological conditions directed by the author, together with a film on psychosis directed by Dolly Sen and produced by the author. The films on neurological conditions visual form agnosia and epilepsy contextualise a mediated reflection on the radical alteration to an individual’s sense of self arising from the experience of a psychiatric disorder.
2.1 Envisaging the neuro-narrative: ‘Eye-See’ 
‘When the areas of our brain that are devoted to processing visual information are damaged, we can no longer make sense of what we see: a condition termed visual agnosia. The condition has many forms. People with visual agnosia are unable to recognise familiar objects, such as a tree or apple…’  (Arends, Slater, 2004). Oliver Sacks states in ‘The Mind’s Eye’: ‘We do not see objects as such; we see shapes, surfaces, contours, and boundaries, presenting themselves in different illuminations or contexts, changing perspectives with their movement or ours…’ (Sacks, 2010).
The short fiction film ‘Eye-See’ (Morrison, 2005) is the story of a young boy with visual form agnosia (a subtype of visual agnosia). The boy hopes that his sighted friend will help him find a magic object he once glimpsed. They set out on their quest not knowing the danger that is hidden from the boy. He cannot ‘see’ that the glinting object is a dangling knife.
The film looks at the condition visual form agnosia, a disorder that affects the ability to perceive the environment in terms of coherent objects while sparing the capacity for acting in space and avoiding obstacles (Milner, Goodale, 2006). To properly represent the condition it is essential that a point of view image in the film, of a knife for example, must be true to the reality of the actual object while at the same time it must not be comprehensible to the boy.
The study of visual deficits affords the neuroscientist an ideal subject for investigation and the source of knowledge of a specific function in the neurotypical or ‘average’ individual. For the filmmaker visual form agnosia presents a profound challenge, that of representing what someone, for whom the visual world is unknowable, ‘sees’. As stated in the introduction, the role of the point of view shot is pivotal in communicating inner experience to a film audience. In the case of visual form agnosia, there is nothing wrong with the boy’s eye sight. It is his brain that is not able to interpret the image in front of him as a knife (Figs 1, 2).
  
    Fig 1. Eye-See Boy’s point of view shot of the knife 	    	Fig 2. Eye-See Knife in foreground 
In this film Professor McCarthy was ‘…our guide into a labyrinthine exposition of the ways in which the neuropsychologist investigates how we see and the construction of diagnostics for diagnosing the condition. For me this was the first step on a journey to losing preconceptions, unpicking assumptions and learning to see ‘for the first time’.’ (Anderson, 2004).
I was privileged to attend McCarthy’s diagnostic sessions with the wonderful young man Michael who was the inspiration for the film and, collaborating with McCarthy throughout the filmmaking process, we ‘developed what we called the ‘neuro-narrative model’ as an empirical means of linking plot to point of view shots’ (ibid). 
By imagining the storyline as a helical shape, where branches radiating from it represented the neurological implications of possible actions and gestures, we were able to manipulate potential story ideas. In this way we identified point of view shots where a significant revelation for the audience, of the knife for example or the boy looking at himself in a mirror (Figs 3, 4, 5), is denied the protagonist due to his condition. Thus: ‘The outcome is a film that anchors an artistic interpretation of Michael’s agnosia within a scientific framework’ (ibid).
  
   Fig 3. Eye-See Boy’s point of view shot in the mirror 	          Fig 4. Eye-See Boy’s image in the mirror 

Fig 5. Eye-See The boy does not recognise himself in the mirror
In order to envision a cinematic representation of the indecipherable point of view shots, I focussed on my own visual experiences with migraine auras. With this in my mind’s eye I then tried to dissociate the lines defining objects from the objects themselves until I experienced fleeting moments of unreadable images; incoherent versions of objects were sustainable for an instant before they snapped into their familiar shapes.
McCarthy’s research introduced me to Marr’s seminal work (Marr, 1976, 1982). His model ‘that aims to recover structures from natural images of everyday objects and surfaces… [his] early visual processing program finds occluding and internal contours from images [the stage at which Michael’s visual information processing seems to have been compromised]…  Marr proposed that cells in the retina and visual cortex of mammals function to locate zero-crossings … in the spatially filtered retinal image, which serve as the first step towards recovering information about edges in the world.’ (Bruce, Green & Georgeson, 2003).
Marr’s representational framework for vision (1982), and ‘proto-images’, provided the means to deconstruct Sack’s ‘shapes, surfaces, contours, and boundaries’ and piece together point of view shots for the film. We re-envisaged three dimensional space in the production design of each of the point of view shots, combining this with computer-generated imagery (CGI) in post production. Thus through playing with depth of field, layering different perspectives and realigning 3D planes that were allowed to move in relation to each other, we were able to create a misleading representation of real objects (Figs 6, 7). ‘The construction of certain shots revealed insights into how someone with visual agnosia might see in ‘real time’.’ (Anderson, 2004).
  
   Fig 6. Eye-See Point of view shot of a ‘no entry’ sign		  Fig 7. Eye-See No entry sign
Editing the film also proved revealing. A test audience needed an average of six times longer ‘to read’ the strange point of view shots than it took to read the image before it has been ‘deconstructed’. Timing was key - if the shot was too short the viewer became confused and lost the narrative flow of the film, too long and the audience tired of trying to decipher the image, reflecting perhaps the feelings of someone for whom the visible world is, and always will be, unfamiliar.   
The intention of the film is to inform an audience about visual form agnosia. However, it cannot convey the actual experience or sense of loss that comes with the condition. ‘This can be worse than being blind’ McCarthy would comment. Memorably Michael’s father, when speaking of his son during the shoot, said ‘Michael doesn’t know I am in the room if I don’t speak or move’. Visual form agnosia is not an experience that can be shared. Nor is the impact of a visual world that cannot be deciphered. What, this paper seeks to question, does it feel like to live in an altered or alienating world, for it to be replaced, in this case by a constantly changing scenario that at every instant defies comprehension and familiarity?
It is impossible to ‘unlearn’ the instantaneous grasp of meaning that is natural to those of us without the condition. There is no common language to share the fundamentally different way of engaging in the sensory-meaning composite of someone with visual agnosia. ‘Injured Brains of Medical Minds: Views from Within’ attempts this through the experience of the remarkable people defined by the book’s title (Kapur, 1997). Neuropsychologist Bryan Kolb reports on his visual field deficit after an occipital stroke: ‘it’s difficult to gain any flavour for what the patient’s perception of the visual loss is, and it is hard to imagine what the patients are experiencing.’ And his subjective feelings about his own visual loss remain enigmatic in his writing (Kolb, 1997).
‘He thinks that he has “gone Mad”’ Edmond Landolt reports of a patient with alexia. ‘Alexia is a specific form of visual agnosia, an inability to recognise written language.’ (Sacks, 2010). This loss of ability in recognition frightens him. He thinks that he has “gone Mad” since he is well aware that the signs that are now unreadable are letters. The cognitive dissonance between what Landolt’s patient knows, what he understands of his own neurological condition, and how it makes him feel, is immediate and visceral. The effect of the condition on his subjective experience directly impacts his sense of self. The inability to interpret signs from the sensory world makes him feel insane. 
If a neurological condition, in rendering alien an aspect of the perceived world, can destabilise to the extent that it can make a person ‘go mad’, what would be the impact of a mental health condition? One where the condition itself has already, historically, been labelled as madness? Before addressing that question through a case study of psychosis told from the subjective perspective, a different neurological condition will be introduced with a reflection on cinema’s facility to refract subjectively.
2.2 The Stranger’s Regard: ‘What’s the Time Mr Wolf?’
Epilepsy has been defined as ‘a brain disorder characterized predominantly by recurrent and un-predictable interruptions of normal brain function, called epileptic seizures. Epilepsy is not a singular disease entity but a variety of disorders reflecting underlying brain dysfunction that may result from many different causes.’ (Fisher et al, 2005).
Dr Sallie Baxendale’s paper ‘Epilepsy at the movies: possession to presidential assassination’ (Baxendale, 2003) documents the misrepresentation of epilepsy in film and the media in general. The persistence of widespread errors and misconceptions disseminated by the media of a condition that is one of the most common neurological diseases globally (WHO) has important repercussions. As the paper states: ‘For most people the cinematic representation of epilepsy may be the only seizure they ever see. This will inevitably shape their attitude towards the disorder.’  That the medium of film could be responsible for the widespread misrepresentation of epilepsy inspired the film that came to be called ‘That’s the Time Mr Wolf?’ (Anderson, 2012).
In concluding its wide ranging study of the depiction of epilepsy in film, the paper ‘found examples of all of the ancient beliefs surrounding epilepsy, such as demonic or divine possession, genius, lunacy, delinquency and general otherness. There is a strong gender bias in the ways in which epilepsy is portrayed. Male characters with idiopathic epilepsy tend to be mad, bad, and are commonly dangerous, whereas the same disorder in their female counterparts evokes exotic intrigue and vulnerability.’ (Baxendale, 2003).
The film ‘What’s the Time Mr Wolf?’ is constructed around a series of acting workshops designed for a group of people with experience of epilepsy. The idea of the workshops was to enable the group to work together and talk about their experience of living with the condition. Dancing and games were introduced into day-long workshops to create an enjoyable and supportive atmosphere for the group to feel safe enough to open up and explore their own feelings about what it meant for them to live with epilepsy.
The film uses workshop footage and interviews with the participants intercut with shots of an actress lying on the pavement, ‘post seizure’, as members of the public walk by. Interviews with neuroscientists Professor Rosaleen McCarthy and Dr Vaughan Bell underpin the impact of epilepsy for those with a condition that can ‘creep up on you at any time’. (Anderson, 2012).
2.2.1 Reflection 
The overriding experience, communicated by the highly articulate, insightful and resilient group, concerned their response to how they were perceived by the public. They all spoke of the reaction their seizure elicited from others: invariably fear, distress, aversion.
Throughout the workshops the participants spoke little of their own feelings and personal experience of having a seizure, unless specifically asked.  Although they themselves had experienced distress, anguish or fear, they mentioned this only in passing, almost apologetically, as if they had no right to their own, subjective, experience. An isolated forthright statement stands out in the film, seeming to speak for all those present: ‘No one ever, ever, ever asks what it’s like for you having a seizure’. (Anderson, 2012).
In an acting exercise, towards the end of the workshop programme, the group was invited to re-enact a seizure. What emerged from the group in directing their own ‘seizure scenes’, was that it was not what it felt like for them to have a seizure that was most distressing but the overpowering reactions their seizure aroused in others - people passing by, strangers, witnesses. The experience of the seizure it seemed was not theirs, it had been appropriated. Subjective and inner feelings had been displaced.
The unwanted reactions of the public ranged from aggression to indifference or taking advantage of the person having a seizure; in the film a young woman tells of how, in a shop, during a seizure someone ‘walked over me because they thought I was drunk’ (Anderson, 2012). Because of the nature of the condition, the person having the seizure is either wholly or partially incapacitated and rendered defenceless. 
In a re-enacted ‘seizure-scene’ a woman lying on the ground looks up at a group of strangers staring down at her. She is alone, there is no one there, except in her mind’s eye.  But the strain in her voice, the desperation in her face, tell her story. ‘I’ve lived with this for years’ she says, crying out in exasperation as she tries to stop the imaginary people from calling an ambulance. In the film a simple point of view shot of strangers looking down on the woman evokes the sense of alienation and impotence felt (Fig 8).

Fig 8.   What’s the Time Mr Wolf?: Point of view shot of a person with epilepsy
A common source of frustration for many with epilepsy is strangers insisting on getting an ambulance when the person with epilepsy knows that they are not in danger. It will bring hours of waiting and tests, only for them to have to find their own way home in the middle of the night. The woman lies on the ground a few yards from her home but her life has been taken out of her hands.
An intensely reactive and usually uninformed public often wants to intercede when all that is needed is to ensure that the person having the seizure is safe, cannot hurt themselves and, when the seizure is past, that they are in the recovery position. 
Someone emerging from an epileptic seizure is further compromised by the fact that they may have little or no recall of what has just happened. The fear is that they may have done or said something embarrassing or acted in a strange or unseemly manner. They may have lost control of movement, they may have urinated. Losing control evokes shame in most of us. 
When returning to full consciousness it is essential to evaluate what has happened - the person with epilepsy may not be safe. The facial expressions and gestures of people around are clues to the puzzle that must be quickly solved. In re-establishing a connection with sensory systems the person who has been unconscious has to find themselves in the world as if from scratch, McCarthy states in the film. They have to defer to ‘the other’s’ account of what happened. An other’s subjective point of view becomes ‘objective truth’.
The condition deprives a person of subjective and objective knowledge and this in turn can radically impact on a sense of self, at some level diminishing, even invalidating it. PJ Eakin draws attention to the pivotal role of recall in his discussion of severe memory loss, and ‘… the fate that might await us all if our social identities should become unmoored from their narrative anchor in autobiographical memory.’ (Eakin, 2004). The moment perception of the exterior world is put in doubt our sense of self is compromised. 
Cinema is often described as the externalisation of the inner process, offering a mediating language between subjective experience and the objective world. Mechanisms of mise-en-scène can serve as boundary objects or as interlocutor in a dialogue between the person who experiences on the one hand, and the observer on the other. The placement and focussing of the camera on one and then another person, the shot - reverse - shot convention, establishes the primacy of a given point of view in an exchange. The audience is aligned with a specific character, reflecting their ‘take on the world’ along an axis of interaction. 
This spelling out of an alignment and an empathising viewpoint creates a syntax of understanding that enacts in the real world an emotional analogue that can speak for a genuine dialogue between the rational and the felt; the doctor’s diagnosis and the patient’s modus operandi for responding meaningfully to the experience of a medical condition. The medium of film has the potential to go beyond the simple dichotomy of interiority and external perception in its evocation of amorphous states that reflect the mind’s process as it negotiates the multiplicity of intermediate and mutating forms as a protagonist strives to articulate some kind of cohesive grasp on reality. Film’s versatility in ‘shifting focus’ mirrors the graduations of consciousness on route to an apprehension of reality.
‘For the classical cinema… “reality” is assumed to be a tacit coherence among events, a consistency and clarity of individual identity. Realistic motivation corroborates the compositional motivation achieved through cause and effect. But art-cinema narration, taking its cue from literary modernism, questions such a definition of the real: the world’s laws may not be knowable, personal psychology may be indeterminate. Here new aesthetic conventions claim to seize other “realities”: the aleatoric world of “objective” reality and the fleeting states that characterize “subjective” reality.’ (Bordwell, 1985).
The potential for an art form to communicate complexity and subtlety as suggested here stands in stark contrast to the medical profession’s sharply defined polarities and emphasis on the rational and scientific. The use of categories and labels to interpret and diagnose symptoms become more critical when investigating mental health conditions. The point is underscored in criteria stipulated in the preface of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders:
‘The criteria are concise and explicit and intended to facilitate an objective assessment of symptom presentations in a variety of clinical settings—inpatient, outpatient, partial hospital, consultation-liaison, clinical, private practice, and primary care—as well in general community epidemiological studies of mental disorders.’  (American Psychiatric Association DSM-5, 2013).
Extrapolating from the above neurological examples, the third case study in this paper explores ways in which cinematic mise-en-scène can interrogate norms that reflect neurotypical assumptions underpinning clearly defined categories; of social or medical categorisation of symptoms, behaviours and emotions.
2.3  Psychosis in a Phone Box:  ‘Outside’
Psychosis has been defined as ‘a mental health problem that causes people to perceive or interpret things differently from those around them. This might involve hallucinations or delusions… The combination of hallucinations and delusional thinking can cause severe distress and a change in behaviour.’ (NHS, 2017)
The website Rethink Mental Illness however states: ‘Psychosis is a medical term. It describes symptoms people have when they experience, believe or view things around them differently to other people. Some people don’t find it helpful to think about psychosis as a mental illness. If you have psychosis, you might see or hear things that others may not, or believe things other people do not. Some people describe it as a “break from reality”.’
The third and final case study ‘Outside’, written and directed by author and mental health advocate Dolly Sen, dramatises and illuminates an experience of psychosis. Its story recounts the consequences of medical advice which fails to comprehend the reality of subjective experience.
‘Outside’, based on a true story, shows a young woman who has been advised by her doctor to ‘go outside’ because that would make her to feel better. But going outside, being in a busy city street, triggers a series of hallucinations that terrify the young protagonist; a flyer that she is given trans-forms into a handful of squirming maggots, and a demon threatens her inside a public telephone box. Is the demon real or in her mind? How can she know? The experience of hearing the demon is as real as any other. Can the young woman trust her own physical sensation of hearing and her subjective experience of the demonic voice? 
In the film the young woman then sees a man skipping down the street. Horrified by an image that must, by its very strangeness, be yet another hallucination, the protagonist looks at the reaction of ‘others’ -  passers by in the street - to see how they respond to the skipping man. When she sees these ‘others’ pointing and laughing at the absurd little skipping man, she is relieved; this is no delusion. The young woman goes to the man and returns to him a suitcase he has dropped while dancing in the street. Her physical action grounds her experience in ‘the real world’, in the world of others, which is to say, strangers that happened to cross her path.
2.3.1 Reflection
The director deploys two principal point of view mechanisms to convey the protagonist’s experience of the two hallucinations that she experiences in order to communicate the visceral impact of a transformation from mundane reality to the menace of an alternative reality. The use of the medium of film language allows for narrative contiguity mirroring the seamless transition from one inner reality to an experience of different subjective ‘realities’.
‘Movies have often been at their most eloquent when the [filmmakers] used the possibilities of visual and aural stylization, of imagination and fantasy, to envision how the world might be perceived by disordered psyches.’ (Kael, 1992).
For the first hallucination the director shows the protagonist looking at the flyer she has been given, then, cutting to her point of view we see a handful of maggots where the flyer once lay. The trans-formation happens in the cut, the experience is spliced into the continuity of the woman’s experience. The act of looking, by both protagonist and audience, reveals the altered object suggesting that it is triggered by the act of looking. The simple juxtaposition of shots provides a moment of revelation that splits the two perspectives of understanding; audience and protagonist no longer share the same reality. We comprehend from the discontinuity of the object that the woman is experiencing an hallucination, for we have been placed in her axis of vision, and the anomalous image has been presented as part of a coherent narrative. 
The effectiveness of the scene derives from placing the viewer in the direct point of view that affords a double reading. We, like the character in the film, feel the impact of the repulsive image of the maggots and at the same time its foreignness triggering the cognitive dissonance that alerts us to deduce the woman’s state of mind. The power of cinematic language is its immediacy in engaging the sensory system enabling us to identify and empathise with the character, and thus in this case with someone suffering from psychosis.
The second hallucination, revealed through more complex use of mise-en-scène and associative point of view shots, is no less affecting. We see the protagonist enter the telephone box. Once in-side our view of her becomes obscured. Nature conspires to veil our vision of the woman. The sun, coming out from behind the clouds mid shot, blinds us, and like her our sense perception is blurred and misted up. We lose our grip on reality as strong light, reflecting off the glass that separates us from the young woman, renders it opaque (Fig 9, 10). Rather than illuminating the protagonist, the sunlight reflects back at us, as if penetrating our own loosening grasp on the outside world. It is us the viewer that the filmmaker chooses to shine her light on as we struggle with the protagonist to determine if the demonic voice at the end of the phone is real or not. 
  
Fig 9.   Outside: Woman hearing a demon on the phone     Fig 10.  Outside: Woman hearing a demon on the phone      
We see as if through a glass darkly. As with our character, an illusion - like a delusion - intercepts our visual hold on reality, floating between us and the reflecting glass an ethereal world plays out, the sun and sky impose across the translucent box that keeps the woman locked in her head. ‘Don’t put me down’; the demon in the film orders her not to replace the telephone receiver. A mirage from the unconscious wills itself into reality.
“We should abandon psychiatric diagnoses altogether and instead try to explain and understand the actual experiences and behaviours of psychotic people. By such behaviours and experiences I mean the kinds of things that psychiatrists describe as symptoms, but which might be better labelled complaints, such as hallucinations, delusions, and disordered speech. I shall argue that, once these complaints have been explained, there is no ghostly disease remaining that also requires an explanation. Complaints are all there is.” (Bentall, 2004).
If experience of psychosis robs a person of the ability to trust the senses through which we all read the outside world, what then is the impact on subjective experience? Returning to address the role of the artist in communicating the importance and inherent value of the subjective, the director of the film ‘Outside’ reflects on her own experience:
“I think psychosis is both the most and least subjective experience there is. The most because there is a shaky and insubstantial connection with the objectivity most other people share. Sometimes I am scared to enter the world with my subjectivity because it is the loneliest subjectivity. With most people telling you it’s wrong or being scared of it, I don’t know what to do with that subjectivity. It’s also a changeable subjectivity. I know most people’s are but with me, it’s extremes, it’s being on a razor-blazoned swing. It’s also the least subjective because it is so uncertain. Which one to choose? Which one to believe? Which one to live by? Which one to hang identity upon? Which one will tell the truth about my life? Did it even belong to me? The ghost of subjectivity haunts me but the ghost hides very well.”
Dolly Sen continues:
“The only place my subjectivity can make sense of its self is through art. There I cannot be told it doesn't exist. And that's why I prefer art over medicine when it comes to feeling like I am a human being in a world that tells me I am a broken one.” (Private communication).
3. CONCLUSION
The paper contextualises the analysis of film case studies, establishing the medical profession’s predilection for quantification and scientific approaches, and the concomitant outcome with regards to authenticating the objective relative to the subjective experience of the patient. The dichotomy is presented in relation to the potential impact of this science-centricity on identity and the effect of destabilisation of self on the doctor-patient relationship.
The suitability of film as interlocutor in conveying subjectivity is proposed, its mediation apposite for manifestations of alternative readings of ‘reality’. Neurological and mental health case studies are analysed demonstrating the facility of cinematic language in privileging the portrayal of subjective experience through the use of editing and point of view shots.
In the first neurological case study the disjuncture between what is being looked at and how it is perceived by someone with visual form agnosia illustrates the extent to which a neurological condition can disturb and disorientate and can ultimately cause a person to question their sanity.
The displacement of objective and subjective knowledge and its appropriation by ‘an other’ is investigated in a film made with a group of people with epilepsy. Film point of view mechanisms reflect both inner experience and the absence of interaction - the cessation of connection with the world and others.
These first two cases studies are used to underscore the possible effect on identity and sense of self that can result from a mental health condition. The final film on psychosis looks at the use of film language to evoke mechanisms of subjective experience in order to elicit empathic responses from an audience.
Film does not so much represent as re-conceive an event in order to render it audio-visible. As a language for the conveyance of the mind or mind’s eye, it accesses an ability to communicate the inchoate or hard-to-articulate in thought or in consciousness, thus it counterpoints the objective and rational modalities of scientific language offering a medium for the ‘unspoken’ feelings of the patient. 
In asking the question ‘Why is so much of what the brain does inaccessible to consciousness?’ (Blakemore, 2010), we are reminded of the importance of the wider sense and meaning of humanity beyond consciousness and the artist’s role in bringing imagination to the act of listening to those with medical conditions.
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